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No. 20100648

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; CITY OF SAINT
GEORGE; ROBERT GOULDING; MICHAEL EATON; STACY
RICHAN; DAVID AMODT; JOHN and JANE DOES I-X; ABC
CORPORATIONS I-X; and XYZ PARTNERSHIPS I-X,
Defendants.

WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT'S BRIEF

The Defendant Washington County School District (School District)
respectfully submits its brief on a certified question of law.

Jurisdictional Statement
The United States District Court for the District of Utah certified a
single question of state law that this Court accepted. The Court possesses

original jurisdiction to answer that certified question under Utah Code
Annotated § 78A-3-102(l) (West 2009).

Question Presented
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act shields government entities
from suit when a plaintiffs injury arises out of, is in connection with, or
results from an enumerated exception to the State's waiver of immunity.
Plaintiffs sued the Washington County School District and others for an
alleged breach of a duty owed to Plaintiffs and their deceased son.
Plaintiffs' injury arose out of and is connected with a high school vice
principal's approval and authorization, as an exception to District policy, to
use of a handgun, shooting blanks, during rehearsals and performances of a
school play. Did the School District's actions and those of its vice
principal constitute the issuance of a "permit, license, certificate, approval,
order, or similar authorization," such that the District retained its sovereign
immunity under the approval exception to Utah's Immunity Act?

2

Standard of Review
When a federal court certifies a question of state law, this Court
answers "the legal question[ ] presented without resolving the underlying
dispute." In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71,1 6, 99 P.3d 793.

Determinative Statutory Provision
The determinative provision of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c), is attached as Addendum B to this
Brief.

Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
This case stems from the tragic death of Tucker Thayer, who for
several weeks prior to his death, worked in the sound booth during
rehearsals and performances of his high school play. Tucker became
injured and died when a handgun, shooting blanks, was discharged near his
head. Tucker should never have come into possession of that gun; instead,
David Amodt, the father of a fellow student, had accepted the responsibility
to transport, maintain, and discharge the gun. Following Tucker's death,

3

Plaintiffs sued the Washington County School District, and others, claiming
the District negligently approved the Desert Hills High School drama
department to use a real handgun, armed only with blanks, to enhance the
sound effects during rehearsals and performances of the stage play
"Oklahoma."

Course of Proceedings in the Federal Court
Plaintiffs sued the School District in federal district court for damages
Plaintiffs suffered by Tucker Thayer's death. Doc. 2, Compl. Plaintiffs
raised one federal claim and nine state law claims, eight sounding in
negligence. Id., Compl., generally.
The School District moved to dismiss all of the state law negligence
claims based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Immunity Act).
See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c). Doc. 27-28. The federal court did
not grant or deny that motion, but certified a single question of Utah law to
this Court. Doc. 41, Minute Order; Doc. Doc. 58, Certification Order at 4-5,
attached as Addendum A to this Brief. This Court accepted that question by
order dated October 4, 2010. Doc. 60.

4

Statement of the Facts
For purposes of this brief, the School District accepts the following
facts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint. See Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc. v.
Utah Dep 't of Health, 2002 UT 5, U 3, 40 P.3d 591.
Plaintiffs Ron and Cathie Thayer are the parents of Tucker Thayer,
who was killed in November 2008 when a handgun loaded with blanks
discharged near his head. Doc. 2, Compl. Tj 1, 12. At the time of his death,
Tucker was fifteen years old and a student at Desert Hills High School, a
secondary school owned and operated by the Defendant Washington County
School District. Id. ffl 12, 14-15.
Desert Hills first opened in August 2008 and shortly thereafter, the
school's drama department put on a performance of the stage play
"Oklahoma." Id. ffl| 15, 18. Tucker participated in that production and
served as a stage tech under the direction of Michael Eaton, the school's
drama instructor. Id.ffl[17-18.
To enhance the sound effects during the play, Mr. Eaton wanted to
discharge a handgun shooting blanks and not a prop gun. Id. f 19. But
Utah law and District policy preclude the possession of a handgun at any
public school Id. ^% 20, 71. At Eaton's request, David Amodt, father of the
5

student stage manager, volunteered his .38 caliber revolver for use during
the play. M ^ 24-25. Thereafter, Eaton sought and received approval to
discharge Amodt's gun, armed only with blanks, as a sound effect during
the stage play. Id.ffi[22, 31-32.
Mr. Eaton first gained approval from Stacy Richan, the School
Resource Officer (SRO) and an in-house representative from the St. George
City Police Department. Id. f 20. SRO Richan approved the use of a
handgun, shooting blanks, on school property, subject to the condition that:
1) an adult transport the gun to and from school for all rehearsals and
performances; 2) the gun remain under adult control and in a locked
container when not in use; and 3) only an adult handle and fire the gun. Id.
122.
Richan then approached Robert Goulding, Desert Hills' Vice
Principal, and informed Goulding of Richan's conversations with Mr.
Eaton. Id. \ 31. Richan also told Goulding of the rules that Richan had
imposed respecting use of the gun. Id. Vice Principal Goulding concurred
with Richan and also approved use the gun under those conditions. Id. fflf

6

30, 32. Amodt was informed of, and agreed to follow, the conditions
regarding use of the gun. See id.fflj34-35.l
But the conditions were not followed, and Mr. Amodt permitted
Tucker Thayer to directly handle and discharge the gun. E.g. id.fflf43-49.
Prior to one performance, the gun discharged near Tucker's head, causing
his death. Id.fflf64, 68-70. No adult was present in the sound booth when
the gun discharged. Id. ^j 65.

Summary of the Argument
This case stems from tragic circumstances and involves Plaintiffs5
wrongful death lawsuit and claim that the School District breached a duty to
protect their minor son. But Utah's Immunity Act confers immunity on
local school districts when the alleged injury arises out of, in connection
with, or results from an approval or other, similar authorization. Here,
Plaintiffs expressly allege and thus concede that Tucker Thayer's death
arose out of and is causally connected with Vice Principal Goulding's

1

Plaintiffs' complaint does not make clear, but subsequent discovery
supports the claim that David Amodt knew and agreed to follow the terms
connected with the use of his gun.
7

decision, as a exception to District policy, to approve and authorize and
approve David Amodt to use his handgun, shooting blanks, to enhance the
quality of the sound effects during Desert Hills' performance of the stage
play "Oklahoma." Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs contend (1) that District is
not immune because it is not a statutorily appointed licensing agency, and
also, (2) that Goulding's actions did not constitute the issuance of an
approval or similar authorization as those terms are used in the Immunity
Act. Neither the Act's plain language nor this Court's common law
precedent support Plaintiffs' view. This Court should hold that the School
District retains its immunity from Plaintiffs' suit.

Argument
THE DISTRICT OFFICIAL'S CONDUCT
CONSTITUTED THE ISSUANCE OF AN APPROVAL
OR SIMILAR AUTHORIZATION SUCH THAT
UTAH'S IMMUNITY ACT BARS PLAINTIFF'S
STATE LAW NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS.
This Court asks the parties to answer whether "[T]he conduct of the
school district officials and those acting on the school's behalf, constitute the
issuance of a 'permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization,' under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) such that the state
8

actors are entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act?" The School District affirmatively answers that
question as follows:

A.

The Allegations Contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint Trigger the
School District's Governmental Immunity.

Because this case comes to it on a certified question, the Court need
address only the final prong of the three-part test for governmental immunity
and determine whether the approval exception2 retains the District's sovereign
immunity here. To do so, the Court need look no further than Plaintiffs'
complaint. That complaint is replete with Plaintiffs' allegations that a St.
George City Police Officer and a Washington County School District official Desert Hills' vice principal - expressly approved the presence of the handgun
that caused Tucker Thayer's death. Those allegations state:
• However, unlike other tragic shootings that have occurred at other
schools in the past, the handgun that killed Tucker Thayer was at the

2

The immune conduct expressed in Section 63G-7-301(5)(c) is
broad, but in prior cases, courts and parties have referred to subsection
301(5)(c) only as the license and permit exception. Because this case stems
from a vice principal's decision to approve an adult to possess and
discharge a handgun, shooting blanks, to enhance sound effects during a
school play, the District refers to section 63G-7-301(5)(c) as the "approval
exception."
9

school with the approval and support of the school's employees and
administration as well as the local police department.
• Apparently believing that the handgun Mr. Eaton was proposing
for use in the play was capable of only firing blanks, SRO Richan
approved the use of the handgun on school property as long as an
adult brought the weapon to school for rehearsals and performances;
the weapon remained under the adult's control and in a locked
container until it was to be used; and the weapon was only to be fired
by the adult.
• After Mr. Eaton spoke to SRO Richan regarding using Mr.
Amodt's gun during the play, SRO Richan approached Mr. Goulding
and told him about his (SRO Richan's) conversation with Mr. Eaton.
SRO Richan told Mr. Goulding that he (SRO Richan) had authorized
the gun to be used during the play and told Mr. Goulding the rules he
had imposed for use of the gun.
• Mr. Goulding agreed with SRO Richan and authorized the use of
the gun during the play, so long as SRO Richan saw that the rules
were followed.
• In response to Mrs. Amodt's questions, Mr. Goulding, on behalf of
the District, authorized the use of the weapon for the production of
"Oklahoma" under the conditions imposed by SRO Richan.
• Like SRO Richan, Mr. Goulding did not inspect the weapon prior
to approving of its used on school property.
See Doc. 2, Compl.fflf13, 22-23, 31-32, 35-36 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs'
complaint also plainly alleges that Tucker's death and their injury resulted from
those approvals See id.,^ 77-78, 105, 111, 115, 121, 127, 145, 152.

10

With similar clarity, the approval exception to Utah's Immunity Act
provides, "that a governmental entity retains immunity, even in the face of
negligence, 'if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . .
the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval,
order, or similar authorization.'" Francis v. State of Utah, 2010 UT 62, ^f 10,
_ P-3d _(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis added)).
Thus, even when read in a light most favorable to them, see Francis, 2010 UT
62, n. 3, Plaintiffs' fact allegations state a claim against the District for which
the District has retained its common law grant of sovereign immunity. This
Court should affirmatively answer the certified question.

B.

The Act's Plain Language Retains the School District's
Immunity.

Plaintiffs' fact allegations aside, each party alternatively asserts that they
prevail under the approval exception's plain language. But only the District's
interpretation of the exception finds support on the face the Immunity Act or in
the this Court's common law precedent.
This Court's "primary objective when interpreting a statute 'is to give
effect to the legislature's intent.'" Francis, 2010 UT 62, ^ 14 (citation and
11

internal quotation mark omitted). And "[t]o discern intent," the Court looks
"first to the statute's plain language." Id. The Court will not stray from that
meaning when it "is unambiguous and there is no compelling reason to believe
that the legislature has misspoken." Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic
Comm % 2007 UT 99, f 13, 175 P.3d 1042. The Court "presume[s]," instead,
"that the legislature used each word advisedly and read[s] each term according
to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Francis, 2010 UT 62, f 14 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, when undertaking a plain
meaning analysis, the Court's "purpose is to render all parts of the statute
relevant and meaningful," State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, f 52, 63 P.3d 621,
and to "avoid [an] interpretation[ ] that will render portions of a statute
superfluous or inoperative." Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, ]f 22, 212 P.3d 547
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Utah's Immunity Act "governs all claims against governmental entities .
.. arising out of the performance of [a government] employee's duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of authority." Utah Code Ann. § 63G7-101(2)(b) (emphasis added). The approval exception, in turn, states that
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived . . .
if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from...
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by failure
12

or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, licenses,
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization.
Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis added).
That statutory language is broad, comprehensive, and umambiguous.
See Francis, 2010 UT 62,ffij15, 17. The language is restricted neither in scope
nor application. It extends to "each government entity" and to the issuance of
"any" approval or similar authorization, including a School District employee's
decision to authorize and approve, as an exception to policy, the use of a
handgun, shooting blanks, during a high school play. See, e.g., Moss, 2007 UT
99, Tf 15. Moreover and recently, this Court has twice recognized the clarity of
the approval exception.
But in Moss, this Court declined to stray from the plain meaning of the
text, because "the statute [was] unambiguous and there [was] no compelling
reason to believe the legislature ha[d] misspoken." Id. at ^ 13. Then, in
Francis, the Court plainly observed that "the statutory language of the
[approval] exception is unambiguous." Id., 2010 UT 62, f 17.
Plaintiffs agree that the approval exception is plain on its face, but to
support their desired outcome, Plaintiffs ask the Court to restrict operation of
the approval exception to only government entities charged with a specific duty

13

to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke authority permitting third party conduct. See
doc. 29, opposition memo at 5, 9-11; doc. 35, supplemental opposition at 5.
But the Utah Legislature has plainly spoken, and Plaintiffs can offer no case
law to support their preferred, restrictive reading of the exception. And as set
out in Point C , below, Utah's common law precedent supports the District's
view.
C.

This Court's Prior Case Law Retains the School District's
Immunity.

Plaintiffs urged the federal court to limit the approval exception to
government entities tasked with a duty to license, permit, or authorize the
conduct of others. But doing so not only contravenes the Act's plain language,
it departs from this Court's common law precedent. "Those asking [the court]
to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion." State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). This Court has previously rejected a
narrow reading of the approval exception and Plaintiffs can show no reason
why the Court should retreat from that prior conclusion. See Moss v. Pete
Suazo Athletic Comm % 2007 UT 99, \ 13, 175 P.3d 1042.
In Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic Commission, Celeste Moss, the sister and
heir to an amateur boxer, sued the Athletic Commission for allowing her

14

brother to engage in a boxing match that resulted in his death. 2007 UT 99, ^
1. Moss alleged that the Commission was negligent for failing to follow its
own rules, id. atfflf3-6, but the Athletic Commission argued that even
accepting Moss's allegations, the approval exception barred her suit. Id. at ffif
7, 12. In response, Moss urged the Court to foreclose application of the
approval exception for licenses granted for activities that posed a risk to health
or safety. Id. at ^ 13. The trial court declined to do so and Moss appealed. Id.
at 1f 9.
On appeal, this Court rejected Moss's proposed interpretation of the
approval exception because Moss failed to produce any case law to support her
position, but more importantly, because Moss's interpretation departed from
the Immunity Act's plain language:
Moss's proposed interpretation would place a condition on the
applicability of the [approval] exception without any textual
support justification. We decline to stray from the plain meaning
of the text where the statute is unambiguous and there is no
compelling reason to believe that the legislature has misspoken.
Mat^f 13.
Moss does not stand alone. This Court has consistently acknowledged
the necessity of governmental immunity in protecting the delivery of vital
government services, and has held that in enacting the Immunity Act, the
15

legislature "recognized the necessity of immunity as essential to the protection
of the State in rendering the many and ever increasing number of governmental
services." Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976). The Court,
therefore, construes statutory wording strictly to preserve that immunity. See
Hall v. Utah Dep 't ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, 114, 24 P.3d 958, 962, Taylor v.
Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.3d 159, 162, 164 (Utah 1996) (the Court applies
the Act's "protective sweep" strictly to preserve immunity expressed on its
face).
One of the Court's most instructive explanations of the need to strictly
construe the Act's plain language can be found in Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch.
Dist, 2002 UT 130, ^f 58, 63 P.3d 705 3 - a decision that Plaintiffs initially,
3

The Lovendahl decision is unique. There, the Court unanimously
reversed the trial court's hazardous waste immunity determination, but the
Justices were divided on the rationale used to support that conclusion.
Chief Justice Durham, joined by Justice Howe, wrote the lead opinion that
declined to extend government immunity to the defendant school district
because the district lacked statutory authority to dispose of hazardous
wastes. But Associate Chief Justice Durrant, joined by Justices Russon and
Wilkins, concluded that because the Immunity Act is plain on its face, the
school district retained its immunity from suit so long as the district could
resolve the fact question of whether the sewer gas at issue constituted a
hazardous waste under Utah law. See id, 2002 UT 130,fflf2, 68-69.
Justice Durrant's concurring and dissenting opinion and "Plain Language
Analysis" constitute the majority and binding view of the Act's plain
meaning. Id. The District adopts that majority view as binding, judicial
precedent, there being no compelling reason to depart from it. See Menzies,
16

albeit incorrectly, relied upon - but which they later abandoned on
supplemental reply. Compare Doc. 29, opposition memo at 7-8 with doc. 35,
supplemental opposition memo at 1 & generally.
In Lovendahl, landowners brought suit against a local school district,
alleging that a vent pipe and blower that the district installed to a school sewer
line emitted foul-smelling sewer gas that unreasonably interfered with the
landowners' use of their property. Id., 2002 UT 130, fflf 6-8. The school
district moved to dismiss the common law nuisance claims, arguing that the
sewer gas constituted a hazardous waste and that the district was immune from
suit under Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10(18)(c),4 covering injuries
resulting from efforts to dispose of a hazardous waste. Id. at ^ 10. The trial
court agreed and landowners appealed. Id. at % 12.
Writing for the minority, Justice Durham stated that even though the
Immunity Act facially applied to "all governmental entities," Id. at f 22, it was

889P.2d393.
4

That provision can now be found at Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7301(5)(s)(iii), that also retains governmental immunity for all injuries that
"arise out of, in connection with, or result[ ] from . . . [activities] regulating,
mitigating, or handling hazardous wastes." Apart from being renumbered,
the legislature has not altered this statutory language despite Justice
Durham's harsh criticism in Lovendahl.
17

"unreasonable" to broadly construe the hazardous waste exception. Id. at \ 24.
Justice Durham looked, therefore, "beyond the plain language of the statute"
and examined the legislative history of the hazardous waste exception.5 Id.
Writing for herself and Justice Howe, Justice Durham then concluded that the
school district did not retain its immunity because the district "did not have
statutory responsibility for handling, mitigating, or disposing of hazardous
wastes." Id. ^ 47.6
5

Counsel for the School District has searched, but has not found
legislative history that specifically addresses the approval exception. But
that exception has always been a part of Utah's Immunity Act and was
included as one of the initial, exceptions to the State's waiver of sovereign
immunity when the Immunity Act was first enacted in 1965. See Utah
Legislative Council, Report of the Governmental Immunity Committee
(Dec. 1964).
6

Significantly, even were this Court to now adopt the minority view,
the result is unchanged. Utah's local school districts have the authority and
duty to provide a safe school environment, free from risk or hazards. See
Washington County School District Policy and Procedure, Safe School
Policy 2110 at § 1 attached as Addendum C to this Brief. To that end, the
Defendant School District enacted a Safe School Policy, which contained
the dangerous weapon provision at issue here. See id at §§ 3.2.2.1.1. to
3.2.2.1.2.
This Court recently held in Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62,^| 16, that
the State of Utah could not look to the authority of the United States Forest
Service to grant or revoke permission for persons to camp on federallycontrolled land to shield the State with immunity from suit arising out the
federal government's authority. In part, the Court observed that because the
federal, not the State government possessed the authority to close the
subject campground, the federal government was the only entity whose
18

Writing for a majority of the Court, however, Justice Durrant determined
that the hazardous waste exception unambiguously applied to "all
governmental entities," not simply those mandated by statute to handle and
dispose of hazardous wastes. Id. at \ 58.
[T]he lead opinion, in effect, amends the statute to read that
immunity is retained for governmental entities that cause injury
while 'regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous wastes,
provided the agency is responsible for providing public services
that specifically relate to those exceptions.'
While this addition to the statutory language may well be good
policy, it does not change the fact that such language is not in the
statute. In order to justify this qualification to the language of the
statute, the lead opinion contains an exhaustive review of the
statute's legislative history. It is well established, however, that
'[w]hen interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain language
and go not further unless we find the language ambiguous.'7
Id. atTJTf 57-58 (emphasis in original).

conduct could fall within the scope of the approval section. Id.
This case presents converse facts. Namely, the School District
promulgated the policy that precluded the possession of a dangerous
weapon on school property. And it was thus the District and its officials
who possessed the authority to enforce or to vary that policy. Accordingly,
because the District possessed the requisite authority to act, granting it
immunity salves Justice Durham's concerns in Lovendahl and promotes the
Court's recent precedent in Francis.
7

Justices Durham and Howe found the hazardous waste exception
"unreasonable," not ambiguous. See id. at \ 24.
19

Justice Durrant recognized that the hazardous waste exception was plain
on its face and granted immunity to all government entities. He concluded
If the legislature had intended to limit immunity to only those
governmental entities that are 'responsible for providing public
services that specifically relate to those exceptions' it would not
have used the word 'all.' Because the plain language of the statute
provides immunity to all governmental entities when the injury
arises out of any of the enumerated exceptions, there is no need to
look any further.
M a t ^[58.
Here, the approval exception retains immunity not only for those
government entities tasked with a specific duty to license or permit conduct,
but the exception pertains to "each" entity. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301.
It therefore pertains to the District and immunizes the District from liability for
Plaintiffs' injury. See Taylor, 927 P.2d at 164 (interpreting assault and battery
exception and stating that "the fact that the assault exception is not expressly
limited to assaults by government-affiliated persons requires that the exception
include injuries caused by non-government assailants.")
Because "the legislature has spoken with clarity on the question of
immunity," the Court "is constrained by the plain language of the Act and [its]
prior case law on this point." Ledfors, 849 P.2d 1162, 1167. Had the
legislature intended to limit application of the approval exception to some, but
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not to "each governmental entity/' Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5), it would
have done so.8 See Moss, 2007 UT 99, ]f 13; Lovendahl, 2002 UT 130, \ 58.

D.

The Act's Ordinary and Accepted Meaning Retains the School
District's Immunity.

Notwithstanding the Act's plain language and this Court's precedent,

8

Granting governmental immunity from suit regarding the issuance,
denial, suspension, or revocation of licenses, permits, approvals or other
authorizations is not unique to Utah. Several states have enacted such
provisions, including California, after whose act the Utah Immunity Act was
patterned. See Report of the Governmental Immunity Committee p. 67. But
unlike Utah, California's legislature included language expressly limiting
the entities to whom approval immunity applies:
A public entity is not liable for any injury caused by the
issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or by the failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit,
license, certificate approval, order or similar authorization
where the public entity is authorized by enactment to determine
whether or not such authorization should issued, denied,
suspended, or revoked.
CAL. GOV'T CODE

§ 818.4 (emphasis added).

Placing such a limitation on the approval exception can only be done
by the legislature. Because, it is for the Utah Legislature, not Plaintiffs or
the courts, to "tailor the waiver of immunity more narrowly . . . Its power to
craft waivers of immunity is far superior to ours." Ledfors, 849 P.2d at
1167.
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Plaintiffs contend that Vice Principal Goulding's conduct cannot give rise to
immunity here, because Goulding's decision to approve constituted not an
"approval... or similar authorization/5 but a day-to-day school operation. The
ordinary and accepted meaning of terms "approval" and "authorization" - and
of the other terms set out in the approval exception, contradict Plaintiffs' claim.
The Immunity Act does not define the terms used in the approval
exception. But when given "their ordinary and accepted meanings," see
Francis, 2010 UT 62, f 14, the School District's conduct falls squarely within
the scope of those terms, which are commonly defined as follows: Permit: "a
written warrant or license granted by one having authority;"
WEBSTER DICTIONARY,

MERRIAM-

http://www.meriiam-webster.com/disctionary/permit:

License: "l.a: permission to act; b: freedom of action . . . 2.a: a permission
granted by competent authority to engage in a business or occupation or in an
activity otherwise unlawful," id., http://www.meriiamwebster.com/disctionary/license: Approval: "an act or instance of approving,"
id., http://www.meriiam-webster.com/disctionary/approval: and Authorization:
"1: the act of authorizing; 2: an instrument that authorizes." Id.,
http://www.meriiam-webster.com/disctionary/authorization.
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Looking at each term, the essential elements include an act or instance of
approving - by a person with authority to do so - conduct not otherwise
permitted. Plaintiffs' own fact allegations meet those touchstones.
Namely, at Mr. Eaton's request, David Amodt volunteered the use of his
.38 caliber handgun during rehearsals and performances of the stage play
"Oklahoma." In turn, a St. George City Police Officer and a Desert Hills vice
principal (persons with authority)9 expressly approved Amodt to transport,
possess, and use that gun on school premises (an act or instance of approving);
as an exception to Utah law and the District's Safe Schools Policy (conduct not
otherwise permitted). Under those circumstances, Vice Principal Goulding's
conduct "constitute[d] the issuance of a 'permit, license, certificate, approval,
order, or similar authorization,' under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) such
that [the School District is] entitled to immunityfromliability pursuant to the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act[.]" See Order of Acceptance.
That interpretation is reasonable. It is also consistent with Utah law.
When confronted in the past with the proper scope of approval immunity, this

9

Plaintiffs, in their complaint, concede that Goulding and Eaton were
the District's agents, acting within the scope of their duties on behalf of the
District, and that each possessed the authority to bind the District. See
Compl.ffil89-97; 120, 123-125, 154-157.
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Court has determined that Section 63G-7-301(5)(c) is broad and not restricted
to decisions that constitute 'licensing decisions per se. Rather, it extends to
approvals and similar authorizations . ..." Moss, 2007 UT 99, f 15.
In keeping with this Court's decision in Moss, the District concedes that
its action - vis a vis Mr. Goulding - did not constitute a "licensing decision,
per se," nor did it have to. But the breadth of the approval exception that this
Court recognized in Moss, includes the School District's authority, as an
exception to policy, to authorize and approve a high school's drama department
to use a real handgun, shooting blanks, and not a prop a gun. See id., ^ 19.
This case, therefore, stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Moss and the District's
immunity should thus be preserved.

Conclusion
Utah's Immunity Act retains and confers immunity on local school
districts when an alleged injury arises out of, occurs in connection with, or
results from an approval or similar authorization. Plaintiffs concede that
Tucker Thayer's death arose out of Robert Goulding's decision, as an
exception to the District Safe Schools Policy, to authorize and approve the use
of a handgun, shooting blanks, during rehearsals and performances of a high
24

school play. That conduct gives rise to the District's immunity under the plain
language of the approval exception to the Immunity Act. It also gives right to
the District's immunity under settled, Utah law. This Court should therefore
hold that the District retains immunity from Plaintiffs' suit and, consequently,
the Court should affirmatively answer the question certified to it.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 28th day of February, 2011.

BRIDGET K. ROMANO
AssistaW Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH,
CENTRAL DIVISION

RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER

ORDER OF CERTIFICATION OF
QUESTION OF STATE LAW

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 2:09 cv 565
vs.

Judge Dee Benson

WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
ROBERT GOULDING, MICHAEL
EATON, STACY RICHAN, DAVID
AMODT, JOHN and JANE DOES I-X,
ABC CORPORATIONS I-X, and XYZ
PARTNERSHIPS I- X,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, hereby enters this order certifying an uncertain question of Utah
law to the Utah Supreme Court.
Undisputed Factual Background:1
In the Fall of 2008, the Desert Hills High School (DHHS) drama department performed
the play "Oklahoma." Complaint ^ 18. DHHS is administered by the St. George School District

1

This matter came before this court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Accordingly, these facts are all taken from plaintiffs Complaint and are stipulated to by the
parties as undisputed for the purpose of this Certification of Question of State Law.
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(the "District"). Complaint lj 14. Michael Eaton was the theater teacher and a District
employee. Complaint 1} 17. To enhance the sound effects, Mr. Eaton wanted to shoot blanks
from a real handgun instead of a prop gun. Complaint ^f 19. But school policy prohibited
anyone from possessing a gun on school premises. Complaint ^ 20. Accordingly, Mr. Eaton
"consulted with the in-house representative of the St. George Police Department, School
Resource Officer (SRO) Stacy Richan." Complaint ^[ 20. "SRO Richan approved the use of the
handgun on school property" subject to three conditions: I) only an adult could bring the weapon
to and from school; ii) the weapon must remain in a locked container and under the adult's
control at all times; and iii) only the adult was authorized to fire the weapon. Complaint % 22.
David Amodt, the father of the student stage manager Sarah Amodt, offered his Smith &
Wesson .38 caliber, six shot revolver to be used in the play. Complaintfflj24-25. After Eaton
spoke to SRO Richan regarding using Mr. Amodt's gun during the play, SRO Richan
approached the DHHS Vice Principal, Robert Goulding, and told him "that he (SRO Richan) had
authorized the gun to be used during the play and told Mr. Goulding the rules he had imposed for
the use of the gun." Complaint T| 31. "Mr. Goulding agreed with SRO Richan and authorized
the use of the gun during the play, so long as SRO Richan saw the rules were followed"
Complaint ^| 32.
In fact, the conditions were not implemented. Complaintfflf42-46. Tucker Thayer was
permitted to handle and fire the weapon outside the presence of Mr. Amodt or any other adult.
Complaintffl[46-64. On November 15, 2008, prior to one of the performances, the gun was
discharged near Tucker's head. Complaint % 64. No adult was present in the sound booth when

2
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the gun discharged. Complaint ^ 65. Tucker died as a proximate result of the discharge.
Complaint f 70. The Complaint alleges that the District's conduct was the "direct and proximate
cause" of their damages. E.g., Complaint ^ 77-78, 105, 111, 115, 121, 127, 145, 152.
Procedural Background:
Plaintiffs, Tucker Thayer's parents, have asserted a variety of claims against the District,
two District employees (the drama teacher (Michael Eaton) and the Vice Principal (Robert
Goulding)), St. George City and a City employee (Stacy Richan.)2 Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts
both state law negligence/wrongful death claims and federal civil rights claims (pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983) against the various defendants.3
The District filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to dismiss all state law claims (i.e., negligence claims)
against it based on governmental immunity. The District argues that, based on the allegations in
the Complaint, plaintiffs' claims arise out of the District's approval of the use of the gun, which
constitutes an immune activity under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. That statute in relevant part provides:
(5) Immunity is not waived . . . . if the injury arises out of, in connection
with, or results from:
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization.

2

Plaintiffs settled their claims against David Amodt.

3

Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the negligence claims against the individual defendants.
3

Case 2:09-cv-00565-DB

Document 58

Filed 08/09/10 Page 4 of 5

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (West 2008). The District argues that the use of the word
"any" and the inclusion of the words "approval, order or similar authorization" requires that the
provision be interpreted broadly and requires a finding of immunity in the instant case.
Plaintiffs respond that the District's decisions and actions regarding the gun were
ministerial acts in the course of their day-to-day, internal operations, and did not constitute any
official act contemplated by U.C.A. § 63G-7-301(5)(c). Plaintiffs further respond that the
District's interpretation of § 63G-7-301(5)(c) is overly broad and would lead to absurd and
unintended results.
The matter was folly briefed and the Court heard oral argument on June 2, 2010. Based
on the parties' briefing and arguments, this Court has concluded that the question whether
Section 301(5)(c)'s approval immunity applies to the facts of this case constitutes an issue of
first impression that has not yet been decided by the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme
Court last addressed Section 301(5)(c) immunity in Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic Comm 'n, 2007
UT 99, 175 P.3d 1042, but left open whether immunity would apply to the facts of this case. For
that reason this Court seeks the guidance of the Utah Supreme Court.
Question of Law to Be Answered:
Because the disposition of the state immunity claim turns on important and unsettled
questions of Utah law, I certify the following legal question to the Utah Supreme Court:
Considering the facts discussed above, did the conduct of the school district officials and
those acting on the school district's behalf constitute the issuance of a "permit, license,
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization" under Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-301(5)(c)
4
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such that the state actors are entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act?
Certification of Question of law to the Utah Supreme Court:
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, on its own motion, submits to
the Utah Supreme Court a request that the Utah Supreme Court exercise its discretion, pursuant
to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to accept the certified question of Utah law
set forth above. This question is a controlling issue of law in the proceeding before this Court,
and there appears to be no controlling authority on this precise question of law. This Court
concludes that certification of this question will further the interests of comity and federalism by
giving the Utah Supreme Court the opportunity to answer the question in the first instance,
should it elect to do so. The clerk of this Court shall transmit a copy of this certification order
and all motions and memoranda filed in conjunction with the District's motion to the Utah
Supreme Court.
DATED this 5th day of August, 2010.
BY THE COURT:

The Honorable Dee Benson
U.S. District Court Judge

5
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Utah Code
Title 63 G General Government
Chapter 7 Governmental Immunity Act of Utah
Section 301 Waivers of immunity — Exceptions.

63G-7-301. Waivers of immunity — Exceptions.
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any contractual obligation.
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations are not subject to the requirements of
Sections 63G-7-401, 63G-7-402, 63G-7-403, or 63G-7-601.
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from a reservoir or
associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to
deliver the contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition
that causes a deficiency in the amount of available water.
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived:
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession of, or quiet title to real or personal property;
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or other liens on real or personal property, to
determine any adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an adjudication about any
mortgage or other lien that the governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal property;
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction, damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or
other property while it is in the possession of any governmental entity or employee, if the property was
seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of state law;
(d) subject to Subsection 63G-7-302(l), as to any action brought under the authority of Article I,
Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity
when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just
compensation;
(e) subject to Subsection 63G-7-302(2), as to any action brought to recover attorney fees under
Sections 63G-2-405 and 63G-2-802;
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah Protection of Public Employees Act; or
(g) as to any action brought to obtain relief from a land use regulation that imposes a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion under Title 63L, Chapter 5, Utah Religious Land Use Act.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
waived as to any injury caused by:
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other
public improvement.
(b) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir,
or other public improvement.
(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury proximately caused by
a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of

employment.
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from:
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function,
whether or not the discretion is abused;
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse
of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
violation of civil rights;
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection;
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or
without probable cause;
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional;
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal
confinement;
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands;
(1) any condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation;
(m) any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands;
(n) the operation or existence of a pedestrian or equestrian trail that is along a ditch, canal, stream, or
river, regardless of ownership or operation of the ditch, canal, stream, or river, if:
(i) the trail is designated under a general plan adopted by a municipality under Section 10-9a-401 or
by a county under Section 17-27a-401;
(ii) the trail right-of-way or the right-of-way where the trail is located is open to public use as
evidenced by a written agreement between the owner or operator of the trail right-of-way, or of the
right-of-way where the trail is located, and the municipality or county where the trail is located; and
(iii) the written agreement:
(A) contains a plan for operation and maintenance of the trail; and
(B) provides that an owner or operator of the trail right-of-way or of the right-of-way where the trail
is located has, at minimum, the same level of immunity from suit as the governmental entity in
connection with or resulting from the use of the trail.
(o) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the clearing of fog;
(p) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
(q) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems;
(r) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements of
Section 41-6a-212;
(s) the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(iv) emergency evacuations;
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency medical assistance can be
rendered or where the person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies;
(t) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, any function pursuant to Title

73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources - Division of Water Resources; or
(u) unauthorized access to government records, data, or electronic information systems by any person
or entity.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 63G07 030100.ZIP 5,684 Bytes
« Previous Section (63G-7-203)

Next Section (63G-7-302) »
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1. Purpose:
The Board of Education of the Washington County School District recognizes that every student in the
schools should have the opportunity to learn in an environment which is safe, conducive to the learning
process, and free from unnecessary disruption. To foster such an environment the following policy has
been adopted and is based on the following principles:

2. Policy:
2.1. Each student is expected to follow accepted rules of conduct;
2.2. Each student is expected to show respect for other people and obey persons in authority
at the school;
2.3. The policy applies to students while in the classroom, on school grounds, on school
vehicles, and in school-related activities or events.
2.4. For mandatory School Reporting of Drug Use - refer to expulsion and attendance in
Utah State Code referenced above.

3- Procedure:

3.1. Definitions:
3.1.1. Suspension is not to be understood as the deprivation of a right to learning, but as the
temporary denial of social interaction through school contact and the removal of the person
from the classroom setting because of real and present disruptive effect of his/her presence,
or a reasonable assumption that his/her presence will be disruptive or a threat to the wellbeing or safety of himself/herself and or other students or staff. Suspension may carry with
it conditions which must be met to remove the suspension. Such conditions may be a joint
responsibility of school personnel, the student and parents, or the sole responsibility of any
one party. Suspension is for no more than 10 school days per incident.
3.1.2. Expulsion is defined as the removal from school and the cessation of educational
services provided by the Washington County School District for any period longer than 10
consecutive days but not more than 1 school year.
3.1.3. Temporary disciplinary transfer means a student is temporarily removed from the
regular school setting by the school administration to an alternative educational setting
because of a violation of the safe school policy, section 3.2.
3.1.3.1. The alternative educational setting should afford the student the opportunity
to receive instruction and, where applicable, receive credit for course work in core
academic areas. The alternative setting is not intended to replicate the student's
current school placement.
3.1.3.2. The parent is responsible for transportation to the alternative educational
setting and is responsible for any fees associated with the program, unless such fees
have been waived.
3.1.3.3. For students with disabilities the procedures for change of placement under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) apply.
3.2. Grounds For Suspension And Expulsion:
3.2.1. A student may be suspended or expelled from school for any of the following
reasons:
3.2.1.1. Frequent or flagrant willful disobedience, defiance of proper authority or
\disruptive behavior; including the use of foul, profane, vulgar, or abusive language.
3.2.1.2. Willful destruction or defacing of school property;
3.2.1.3. Behavior or threatened behavior which poses an immediate and significant
threat to the welfare, safety, or morals of other students or school personnel or to the
operation of the school, including bullying, emotional, physical or sexual harassment
(see policy 1425 on sexual harrassment); (10-12-99)
3.2.1.4. Possession or use of pornographic material on school property. (H.B. 100- 430-07)
3.2.1.5. Possession, control, or use of an alcoholic beverage as defined in Section
32A-1-105 of the Utah Code;

3.2.1.6. Possession, control, or use of tobacco;
3.2.1.7. Behavior described in Section 3.2.2 which threatens harm or does harm to the
school or school property, to a person associated with the school, or property
associated with any such person, regardless of where it occurs.
3.2.1.8. Because of identification and association with gangs, the following will not
be permitted on school campuses or at school activities: bandannas or any article of
clothing bearing gang symbols, names, initials, insignia, or anything else that signals
gang affiliation.
3.2.1.9. When a school official determines that time is needed to establish further
facts of an act or series of acts of disobedience and misconduct disruptive to the
learning process which may lead to suspension or expulsion from school.
3.2.2. A student shall be suspended or expelled from school for any of the following
reasons:
3.2.2.1. Any serious violation affecting another student or staff member, or any
serious violation occurring during school hours, including lunch/break time, in a
school building, in or on school property, or in conjunction with any school activity,
including:
3.2.2.1.1. Possession, control, or actual or threatened use of a real weapon,
explosive, or noxious or flammable material;
3.2.2.1.2. The actual or threatened use of a look alike weapon with intent to
intimidate another person or to disrupt normal school activities;
3.2.2.1.3. The sale, control, or distribution of a drug or controlled substance as
defined in Section 58-37-2;
3.2.2.1.4. The sale, control, or distribution of an imitation controlled substance
as defined in Section 58-37b-2;
3.2.2.1.5. The sale, control, or distribution of drug paraphernalia as defined in
Section 58-37a-3.
3.2.2.2. The commission of an act involving the use of force or threatened force
which if committed by an adult would be a felony or class A misdemeanor.
3.2.2.3. A student who commits a violation of section 3.2.2 above involving a real or
look alike, weapon, explosive, or flammable material shall be expelled from school
for a period of not less than one year, subject to the following:
3.2.2.3.1. Within 45 days after the expulsion, the student shall appear before the
student's local school board superintendent or the superintendent's designee,
accompanied by a parent or legal guardian; and
3.2.2.3.2. The superintendent shall determine:

3.2.2.3.2.1. What conditions must be met by the student and the student's
parent for the student to return to school;
3.2.2.3.2.2. If the student should be placed on probation in a regular or
alternative school setting consistent with Section 53A-l 1-907, and what
conditions must be met by the student in order to ensure the safety of
students and faculty at the school the student is placed in; and
3.2.2.3.2.3. If it would be in the best interest of both the school district
and the student to modify expulsion term to less than a year, conditioned
on approval by the local school board and giving highest priority to
providing a safe school environment for all students.
3.2.2.4. A student may be denied admission to school on the basis of having been
expelled from that or any other school during the preceding 12 months. A suspension
or expulsion under this policy is not subject to the age limitations under Subsection
53A-11-102(1).
3.3. Suspension Procedures:
3.3.1. Authority is delegated from the Washington County School District Board of
Education to school principals and assistant principals to suspend students for up to 10
school days. When a student is suspended he/she will be told verbally or in writing the
reasons for suspension the period of time for which the student is suspended and be given
an opportunity to present his/her case to the principal or his/her designate except in an
extreme case where the danger to the individual or others is such that immediate removal
from school is imperative.
3.3.2. If it is determined by the principal or assistant principal that a suspended student must
immediately leave the school building and the school grounds, the principal or assistant
principal shall determine the best way to transfer custody of the student to the parent or
guardian or other person authorized by the parent or applicable law to accept custody of the
student.
3.3.3. If there is reasonable validity to the student's explanation and his/her presence in
school will not be disruptive or injurious to himself/herself and others, he/she will be
allowed to remain in school until a more thorough investigation regarding the facts in the
case can be made at which time a decision will be made regarding whether to suspend or
not to suspend the student. In any circumstances where suspension is made, the parents or
legal guardian must be notified as soon as possible, but not later than 24 hours by telephone
or mail of the suspension and asked to discuss the matter with the appropriate school
official. At this conference, the reasons for the suspension will be discussed along with the
conditions upon which the matters might be resolved and the student returned to school.
3.3.4. If a satisfactory resolution cannot be reached, the student may be suspended from
school a maximum of 10 days. If a satisfactory resolution cannot be reached and the student
returned to school within the 10 day period, the student may be subject to a temporary
disciplinary transfer or a recommendation made that the student be expelled from school.
3.4. Expulsion Procedures:

3.4.1. Authority is delegated from the Washington County School District Board of
Education to the Superintendent or his/her designee to expel students from school for any
period of time beyond the 10-day suspension period, but not more than one school year.
Recommendations for expulsions are to be submitted by the principal to the Superintendent.
If the principal recommends expulsion, he/she shall contact the student and his/her parent(s)
or guardian(s) within 24 hours of the time of the recommendation by telephone or certified
mail. (If contacted by phone the principal will follow the contact with a written notice.)
Such notice shall include:
3.4.1.1. A statement that the principal is recommending expulsion;
3.4.1.2. The length of time for which the expulsion is being recommended;
3.4.1.3. A description of the school regulation(s) allegedly violated by the student;
3.4.1.4. A statement of the facts as known to the principal leading to the
recommendation for expulsion;
3.4.1.5. The time and place of the expulsion hearing;
3.4.1.6. A copy of this policy.
3.5. The Expulsion Hearing:
3.5.1. The hearing shall be conducted before an impartial tribunal consisting of the
Superintendent of Schools or his/her authorized representative and two other professional
staff persons, not complaining parties, to the action against the student. In expulsion
proceedings, findings of fact and penalties shall be determined by a majority vote of the
hearing panel.
3.5.2. All persons presenting information shall appear in person at the hearing. Each of the
complaining parties will have the opportunity to present its views on the situation to the
hearing panel. The school administration and the parent may present witnesses, although
witnesses cannot be compelled to attend.
3.5.2.1. The parent may be accompanied by legal counsel if the tribunal will be
accompanied by legal counsel.
3.5.3. The tribunal reserves the right to contact persons or otherwise obtain facts that will
assist them in reaching an informed decision.
3.5.4. The decision of the tribunal will be sent in writing via registered mail to each of the
complaining parties within 24 hours of the decision. The decision shall contain notice of the
right of either party to appeal the decision to the Board of Education.
3.5.5. Results of all expulsion hearings shall be reviewed by the Superintendent or his/her
designee, and the conclusions reported to the Board of Education at least once each year.
3.6. Appeal of Expulsion to the Board of Education:
3.6.1. The student or principal may request an appeal hearing before the School Board, or a

committee consisting of at a majority of the voting members of the school board. Requests
for an appeal hearing to the Board of Education shall be made in writing to the
Superintendent and must be received within seven (7) days upon receiving the written
decision of the hearing panel. This appeal hearing shall be held within one week, if possible,
of the date such a request is received, or as soon thereafter as can be scheduled.
3.6.2. The Board or committee thereof conducting the appeal hearing, shall determine
specifically if there was sufficient evidence to find that the alleged violation(s) occurred and
if the penalty imposed was appropriate for the violation(s). At the appeal hearing:
3.6.2.1. The Board or committee shall review all written documents in the case;
3.6.2.2. Each of the complaining parties may address the Board or committee on the
evidence and the appropriateness of the decision of the hearing panel.
3.6.3. The decision of the tribunal shall be in effect upon the student pending the decision of
the appeal to the Board or committee. The decision of the Board or committee shall be
forwarded via registered mail to each of the complaining parties within 24 hours of the
decision.
3.7. Alternatives to Suspension or Expulsion:
3.7.1. Prior to suspending or expelling a student for repeated acts of willful disobedience,
defiance of authority, or disruptive behavior which are not of such a violent or extreme
nature that immediate removal is required, good faith efforts shall be made to implement a
remedial discipline plan that would allow the student to remain in school. These may
include an in-school suspension program, or a plan where the parent or guardian, with the
consent of the student's teacher or teachers, would attend class with the student for a period
of time specified by the principal or assistant-principal.
3.7.2. If the parent or guardian does not agree or fails to attend class with the student, the
student shall be suspended in accordance with the conduct and this policy.
3.7.3. The parent or guardian of a suspended student and the principal or assistant-principal
may enlist the cooperation of the Division of Family Services, the juvenile court, or other
appropriate state agencies, if necessary, in dealing with the student's suspension. (See Utah
Code, Title 53A-11-903 and 53A-11-103(2).)
3.8. Education of Excluded Students:
3.8.1. If a student is expelled from school without educational services for more than 10
days, the parent or guardian is responsible for undertaking an alternative education plan
which will ensure that the student's education continues during the period of expulsion. The
parent or guardian shall work with the principal or assistant-principal to determine how that
responsibility might best be met through private education or other alternatives which will
reasonably meet the educational needs of the student. Costs for educational services which
are not provided by the school district are the responsibility of the student's parent or
guardian.
3.8.2. Any student temporarily suspended from regular classroom instruction shall be

allowed full opportunity to make-up work missed as a result of the suspension. It is the
responsibility of the student to contact his/her teacher(s) to obtain missed assignments, tests,
etc.. The principal or assistant principal shall inform the student as to the procedures for
contacting the teacher(s) to obtain work during the period of suspension.
3.8.3. The parent or guardian and the principal or assistant-principal may enlist the
cooperation of the Division of Family Services, the juvenile court, or other appropriate state
agencies to meet the student's educational needs.
3.8.4. The school shall contact the parent or guardian of each expelled student under the age
of 16 at least once a month to determine the student's progress.
3.8.5. Application of Policy to Students With Disabilities:
3.8.6. The District shall maintain a record of all suspended and expelled students and a
notation of the suspension or expulsion shall be attached to the individual student transcript
and may be removed at the end of the suspension or/expulsion period.
The policy applies to student with disabilities to the extent permissible under applicable law
or regulation. If application of any requirement of this policy to a student with a disability is
not permissible under applicable law or regulation, the principal or assistant-principal shall
implement other actions consistent with the conflicting law or regulation which shall most
closely correspond to the requirements of this policy.
3.9. Temporary Disciplinary Transfer Procedure:
3.9.1. The parent must be notified in writing within 10 days of the administrative decision to
transfer the student to an alternative educational setting as a result of a violation of Section
3.2. The notice shall include:
3.9.1.1. The reason for the transfer to an alternative setting.
3.9.1.2. The length of stay in the alternative educational setting.
3.9.1.3. Any conditions that would afford the student the opportunity for an early
return to school.
3.9.1.4. Information on how to check-out of the current school, including information
about turning-in work the student may have completed.
3.9.1.5. Information on how to enroll in the alternative educational setting, and
3.9.1.6. The opportunity to request an informal hearing on the matter. A written
request for a hearing must be submitted by the parent to the school principal within
10 days of the receipt of the notice.
3.9.1.7. A copy of the letter is forward to the Superintendent (or designee).
3.10. Procedures for an Informal Hearing

3.10.1. The informal hearing must be conducted within 10 days of receiving the written
request, unless the school calendar requires more time, or if either the parent or hearing
officer is unable to meet the deadline.
3.10.2. The hearing officer can be one person or a panel of up to 5 people approved by the
school principal as being able to objectively review the situation. This does not imply that
the hearing officer or panel members are uninformed of the situation.
3.10.3. The parent shall receive written notice of:
3.10.3.1. The date, time, and place of the hearing.
3.10.3.2. A brief outline of the circumstances that led the school administration's
decision to transfer the student to an alternative educational setting, including names
of witnesses (e.g., school staff, or law enforcement officers) unless the school
principal deems that releasing the names of witnesses may lead to physical or
emotional harm.
3.10.3.3. The opportunity to present witnesses, although witnesses cannot be
compelled to attend.
3.10.3.4. The opportunity to be accompanied by legal counsel if the hearing officer
and/or panel will be accompanied by legal counsel.
3.10.3.5. A copy of the Safe School Policy.
3.11. The written decision of the hearing officer or panel shall be made available to the parent
within 10 days. The decision will include notice of the opportunity to appeal the hearing decision
to the Superintendent (or designee). (The parent must exhaust all administrative remedies and
cooperate and participate in the administrative process prior to appealing the decision to a court of
law.)
3.12. An appeal hearing before the Superintendent (or designee) must be requested in writing
within 10 days of receipt of the hearing decision. An appeal hearing must be conducted within 10
days of receiving the written request, unless the school calendar requires more time, or if either
the parent or hearing officer is unable to meet the deadline. The Superintendent (or designee) may
select a panel of up to 5 people approved by the Superintendent as being able to objectively
review the situation. This does not imply that the panel members are uninformed of the situation.
3.12.1. The parent shall receive written notice of the appeal hearing which includes:
3.12.2. The date, time, and place of the appeal hearing.
3.12.3. The opportunity to present witnesses, although witnesses cannot be compelled to
attend.
3.12.4. The opportunity to be accompanied by legal counsel if the appeal hearing officer
and/or panel will be accompanied by legal counsel.
3.12.5. A copy of the Safe School Policy.

3.13. The Superintendent (or designee) shall obtain a copy of the record used at the hearing which
may be reviewed at the appeal.
3.14. The decision of the appeal hearing shall be made available to the parent in writing within 10
days of the decision.
3.15. The student remains in the alternative educational setting pending the decision of the
informal hearing or appeal.
3.16. Distribution of Policy:
A copy of the grounds for suspension and expulsion from this policy shall be provided to each
student upon enrollment in a school in the Washington County School District. A copy of the
grounds for suspension and expulsion from this policy shall be posted in a prominent location in
each school. Any significant changes shall be distributed to the student in the school and posted in
the school in a prominent location. (Approved 6-13-95)
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